

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-07 ERDA-05 AF-10 ARA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 /135 W
-----019406 082136Z /73

R 082011Z SEP 77
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5220
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 2910

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: US/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON THE SPECIAL SESSION
ON DISARMAMENT

1. SUMMARY: IN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AT USUN SEPTEMBER 2 ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE SPECAIL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZED THEIR CONCERN THAT THE SSOD WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS TOPROCEED MORE RAPIDLY THAN REALISTICALLY POSSIBLE WITH DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND INDICATED THEIR GENERAL PREFERENCE FOR A DAMAGE-LIMITING APPROACH. WE EMPHASIZED INSTEAD OUR READINESS TO SUPPORT THE SSOD PROVIDED THE NON-ALIGNED MAINTAIN A MODERATE AND REASONABLE POSITION AND TONE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES. THE SOVIETS REAFFIRMED THEIR DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN THE CCD CO-CHAIRMANSHIP AND TO AVOID THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CCD/UN LINK WHICH WOULD SUBORDINATE THE FORMER TO THE LATTER. THE US, WE INDICATED, IS TAKING A FLEXIBLE POSITION ON THE CCD CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ISSUE.

WE ALSO UNDERScoreD THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY THE
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SSOD TO GAIN INCREASED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. END SUMMARY.

2. AT SOVIET REQUEST, AMBASSADOR LEONARD, AND SSOC COORDINATOR WEILER MET WITH SMUN MINISTER FOKINE AND TIMERBAEV FROM MFA DISARMAMENT DIVISION ON SEPTEMBER 2 TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD), SOVIET

DRAFT DOCUMENTS (USUN 2711) AND OTHER DISARMAMENT MATTERS.

3. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT: LEONARD OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET DRAFTS WERE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE INFORMAL EFFORTS UNDER WAY AMONG THE REGIONAL GROUPS PRECEDING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE SSOC DOCUMENTS WHICH WILL BE UNDERTAKEN EARLY NEXT YEAR. HE NOTED THAT AN INFORMAL TEXT DRAFTED BY SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES PROBABLY WOULD BE CIRCULATED SHORTLY BUT THAT, WHILE WE HAVE SEEN IT, IT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS REPRESENTING US POSITIONS. NOTE: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED TO CIRCULATE THEIR REVISED DRAFTS AT THIS SESSION OF THE PREPCOM.

4. SPECIAL SESSION DOCUMENTS:

A) THE DECLARATION - WITHOUT COMMENTING IN DETAIL ON THE SOVIET DRAFTS, LEONARD SAID THAT WE SHARE THE RATHER GENERAL APPROACH TO THE DECLARATION TAKEN BY THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS HE NOTED, ARE AWARE OF OUR DISAGREEMENTS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES -- E.G., MDW, NUF. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER THE DECLARATION OR THE PROGRAM OF ACTION SHOULD STIPULATE SPECIFIC TIMETABLES FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. IN GENERAL, LEONARD OBSERVED, THE US INTENDS TO TAKE A STANCE SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH WE ADOPTED AT LAGOS, I.E., TO ENCOURAGE THAT NON-ALIGNED TO TAKE A REASONABLE AND MODERATE LINE SO THAT WE COULD ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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THE FINAL DOCUMENTS (S):

B) PROGRAM OF ACTION: WEILER SAID THAT THIS COULD CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN THE DECLARATION AND WOULD BE THE MORE IMPORTANT DOCUMENT. TIMERBAEV EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE MEXICAN APPROACH, WHICH ENVISAGES A LIMITED PROGRAM OF ACTION IDENTIFYING HIGH-PRIORITY ISSUES, WOULD INCREASE PRESSURES ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, PARTICULARLY ON THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. LEONARD OBSERVED THAT NONETHELESS, THIS WAS PREFERABLE TO A LENGTHY LISTING OF OBJECTIVES, MANY OF WHICH WOULD BE UNATTAINABLE;

C) MACHINERY: THE SOVIETS AGREED WITH OUR OBSERVATION THAT THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT MACHINERY SHOULD BE LINKED TO THE CONTEXT OF THE PROGRAM OF ACTION. LEONARD OBSERVED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE TRYING TO REACH ANY DECISION ON DISARMAMENT MACHINERY AT THIS TIME BUT WOULD RELATE OUR POSITION TO THE PROGRAM OF ACTION. TIMERBAEV NOTED THAT, AS FAR AS THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED, THE PRESENT MACHINERY SUPPLEMENTED BY THE CONVENING OF A WDC WERE SUFFICIENT.

5. SSOD PREPCOM MEMBERSHIP: FOKINE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD RAISE AGAIN AT THE 32ND UNGA THE EE GROUP'S REQUEST FOR TWO ADDITIONAL SEATS, FOR BULGARIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ON THE PREPCOM, LEONARD NOTED THAT THE WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED GROUPS WERE FIRM IN WANTING TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT PREPCOM COMPOSITION AND SUGGESTED THAT THE SOCIALIST CAMP WAS DOING A DISSERVE TO ITSELF BY CONTINUING TO INSISTING ON PUSHING THIS ISSUE. NOTE: THE SOVIETS MAY PROPOSE MAKING THE PREPCOM AN OPEN-ENDED COMMITTEE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 2910

6. THE SSOD AND NON-PROLIFERATION: LEONARD HIGHLIGHTED A NUMBER OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD BE HELPFUL IN SEEKING TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME AND GAIN MORE SUPPORT FOR THE NPT, INCLUDING
A) THE PUBLICITY OVER SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS.
B) THE MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES OF THE NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

TIMERBAEV AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS, ADDING THAT THE 32ND UNGA WOULD BE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF PRO-NPT EFFORTS THAN THE PRECEDING ASSEMBLY HAD BEEN. FINLAND HAS INFORMED THAT SOVIETS THAT IT INTENDS TO PUT FORWARD A STRONGER VERSION OF ITS NON-PROLIFERATION RESOLUTION AT THE UPCOMING SESSION.

7. THE SPECIAL SESSION AND THE CCD: AFTER REVIEWING

BRIEFLY THE INTEREST OF A NUMBER OF CCD MEMBERS AND OTHER
IN A MODIFICATION OF THE CCD CO-CHAIRMANSHIP, LEONARD
OBSERVED THAT WE WERE TAKING A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THIS
ISSUE. IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE FRENCH WERE BEGIN-
ING TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION RE THE CCD, AND THE CO-
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CHAIRMANSHIP ISSUE WAS ONE OF THE FACTORS IN THEIR ASSESS-
MENT OF WHETHER TO JOIN IT. THE CO-CHAIRMAN, LEONARD CON-
TINUED, WOULD HAVE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS AND OTHER
CCD PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN UP AT THE SPECIAL SESSION.
THE US AGREES WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE ESSENTIALITY OF PRE-
SERVING THE CONSENSUS PRINCIPLE AND OF AVOIDING THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF A DIRECT CCD/UN LINK, AS ENVISAGED BY SOME
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, BY WHICH THE CCD WOULD BECOME SUB-
ORDINATE TO AND RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE UN.

8. TIMERBAEV RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO
STRENGTHEN THE CCD CO-CHAIRMANSHIP. A DIRECT CCD/UN LINK
IN WHICH THE UN COULD GIVE ORDERS TO THE CCD, HE SAID,
WOULD DO IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO THE CCD. IF THE SPECIAL
SESSION WERE TO FORM SUCH A LINK, IT WOULD BE NECES-
SARY TO ESTABLISH A NEW CCD..LEONARD CONCLUDED THIS PART
OF THE DISCUSSION BY OBSERVING THAT THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP
ISSUE WAS MAINLY A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN WHICH OTHER
CCD MEMBERS PERCEIVED US AS HOLDING ONTO AN OUTDATED AR-
BITRARY CONTROL OF THE CCD. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THE US
AND THE USSR WOULD CONTINUE TO EXERT A MAJOR ROLE IN THE
CCD EVEN IF THEY GIVE UP THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP. AMONG OTHER
POSITIVE RESULTS, THIS DEVELOPMENT ALSO COULD BRING WORLD
PUBLIC OPINION TO ENCOURAGE CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN THE
CCD.

9. FURTHER US/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS: TIMERBAEV SAID THAT
THE SOVIETS WANT TO HAVE FURTHER BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS ON THE SPECIAL SESSION AND OTHER DISARMAMENT ISSUES
DURING THE 32ND UNGA. AMBASSADOR ISSRAELIAN AND OTHER
MFA OFFICIALS DEALING WITH DISARMAMENT WILL BE IN NEW YORK
DURING FIRST COMMITTEE MEETINGS. LEONARD WELCOMED THIS
SUGGESTION AND IT WAS AGREED THAT A MEETING WOULD BE OR-
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
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